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I. INTRODUCTION
The infamous Trail Smelter arbitral award 2 is venerated as
the "the germ from which the entire law of transboundary
environmental harm sprang."3 The arbitration held that states have
a duty to prevent transboundary environmental harm, and that they
4have an obligation to pay compensation for the harm they cause.
This finding, however, does not recognize that the true source of
pollution in the arbitration was a Canadian mining company. Other
environmental disasters, such as Chernobyl, Bhopal, and the 1989
Exxon Valdez oil spills equally illustrate that multinational cor-
porations (MNCs) and private businesses are largely responsible
for disasters which result in large scale environmental damage. For
that reason, the accountability of private actors, such as corpora-
tions, should be an issue of considerable importance to interna-
tional environmental law. This begs the question: does inter-
national law provide for MNC liability for environmental damage
either directly or indirectly. If so, how can they be held
accountable under international law? The foregoing questions will
be respectively answered in Parts 1 and 2 and 3.
II. PART 1: INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TREATIES AND
DIRECT LIABILITY REGIMES
Leaving aside theoretical academic discussions as to
whether MNCs may be subjects of international law, there is
relatively little direct hard-law regulation of MNCs at the
2 Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal: Decision, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1941); Trail
Smelter Arbitral Tribunal: Decision, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 182 (1939).
3 Stepan Wood, Book Review, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 637, 637 (2007)
(reviewing R.M. BRATSPIES & R.A. MILLER EDS., TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION
(2006)).
4 id.
5 See History's Worst Environmental Disasters, 7 JAPAN SCOPE 24, 24-25. See
also Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Emergency Disaster
Reports, http://www.reliefweb. int/ochaunep/edr/list.htm (last visited Jan. 22,
2010).
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international level.6  However, the role of MNCs in international
environmental law does not appear to be as contested as it is in
other fields, such as human and labor rights.
As a general rule, the primary focus of international regula-
tion for environmental activities is the state. As with all fields of
international law, the greater part of environmental regulation of
MNCs derives only secondarily from Multilateral Environmental
Agreements (MEAs),7 which pose primary obligations on states to
ensure respect for the international obligations they have accepted
within their territory or jurisdiction by all entities.8 Nevertheless,
there are notable exceptions to this rule. For example, the 1989
Basel Convention,9 developed in response to the demands from
6 Nonetheless, there has been considerable effort since the 1970s to develop
codes and obligations at the international level, which apply to and regulate the
activities of multinational corporations insofar as human and labour rights are
concerned. See Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on the Promotion and
Prot. of Human Rights, Norms On The Responsibilities Of Transnat'1 Corps.
And Other Bus. Enters. with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 13, 2003); Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-
Comm'n on the Promotion and Prot. of Human Rights, Draft Fundamental
Human Rights Principles for Business Enterprises, Addendum 1, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/X/Add.1, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/WG.2/WP.1 /Add.1 (Nov.
2001); Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Appoints John
Ruggie of United States Special Representative on Issue of Human Rights
Transnational Corporations, Other Business Enterprises, U.N. Doc SG/A/934
(July 7, 2005); INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, TRIPARTITE
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND
SOCIAL POLICY (1977) (amended 2000), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/
employment/multi/download/english.pdf.; ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC. CO-
OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES (2000), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf.; United
Nations Global Compact, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (last visited Jan. 22,
2010).
7 See PETER T. MUCHLINSKI, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND THE LAW 556-
66 (2d ed. 2007).
' United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 192, Dec. 10, 1982
(prescribing that states have obligations to protect and preserve the marine
environment); id at art. 204 (obliging states to monitor the effects of activities
in which they engage, or permitting the duties to be carried out by third parties,
in order to assess any pollution of the marine environment).
9 See Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movement of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, March 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657; BASEL
CONVENTION, BASEL PROTOCOL ON LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR
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developing countries for the international community to regulate
the trade of hazardous wastes to less developed countries,
criminalizes the illegal traffic of hazardous wastes by all persons,
natural or legal.'0 At the international1 and regional level,12 further
agreements also extend their respective prohibitions concerning the
trans-boundary movements of wastes, notably to Africa, to MNCs.
A further exception includes international instruments,
which provide civil liability for private parties. Considering one of
the fundamental cornerstones of environmental law is the "polluter
pays" principle, numerous MEAs provide for the civil liability of
MNCs when they engage in prohibited activities, as well as for
compensation for any resultant damage.' 3 While not seeking to
directly regulate MNC activities at the international level, such
instruments, pose direct obligations on certain private parties,
including registered owners of vessels, to maintain compulsory
insurance coverage. These instruments recognize that individual
liability is more appropriate than generalized state responsibility in
certain instances. MEAs providing for civil liability regimes
typically regulate certain categories of environmental damage,
three of which follow as examples.
DAMAGE RESULTING FROM TRANSBOUNDARY MOVEMENTS OF HAZARDOUS
WASTES AND THEIR DISPOSAL (1999), http://www.basel.int/meetings/cop/cop5/
docs/prot-e.pdf.
10 See id. at 2(14) (defining persons as any natural or legal person), art. 4(3)
(providing that such illegal traffic is criminal), art. 9(5) (requiring states to
outlaw it in national laws).
11 Lom6 IV Convention, Dec. 29 1989, 29 I.L.M. 783 (signed by the European
Union and 69 African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries). Id. at art. 39
(prescribing a full ban on all exports of hazardous wastes from any destination
to Africa).
12 See Bamako Convention on the Ban of the Import Into Africa and the Control
of Transboundary Movement and Management of Hazardous Wastes Within
Africa, Jan 30, 1991 30 I.L.M. 773 (signed by the members of Organization of
African Unity) Id. at art. 1(16) (defining a person as any natural or legal
person).
13 See MUCHLINSKI, supra note 6, at 571-72. See also DONNA CRAIG,
ENVIRONMENTAL OUTLOOK - LAW AND POLICY, 223-25 (Ben Boer et al. eds.
1994); Alexandre Kiss & Dinah Shelton, Strict Liability in International
Environmental Law 1140 (Geo. Wash. U. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory,
Working Paper No. 345, 2007).
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As early as 1969, direct civil liability for damages arising
from oil pollution was imposed on the "owner of a ship," 14 usually
corporations. 1 In 1971, an international fund was created to pay
compensation in cases where the original convention could not so
provide. 16 In 1992, the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions were
consolidated into one Protocol, which expanded the geographical
scope of the fund to include pollution damage caused in the Exclu-
sive Economic Zone (EEZ).17 Three similar conventions provide
for civil liability for private actors in cases of oil pollution arising
from exploration of the seabed,18 the carriage of noxious sub-
stances at sea1 9 and pollution created by bunker oil.20 Compen-
sation claims for pollution damage are brought directly against the
ship's registered owner, his insurer or other persons providing
financial security for the owner's liability for pollution damage.
Further, as its name indicates, the 2003 Protocol on Civil
Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the Trans-
boundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary
Waters also provides for legal claims against companies. Indivi-
duals affected by the transboundary impact of industrial accidents
on international waterways (e.g. fishermen or operators of
downstream waterworks) work without adequate and prompt
14 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage art. 4,
Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, amended by Protocol of 1992, Nov. 27, 1992.
15 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage art. 4,
Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3, amended by Protocol of 1992, Nov. 27, 1992.
16 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for
Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage, Dec. 18, 1971, 1110 U.N.T.S. 57,
amended by Protocol of 1992, Nov. 27, 1992.17 Id., amended by Protocol of 2003, May 16, 2003.
8 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage
Resulting from the Exploration for or Exploitation of Seabed Mineral
Resources, Dec. 17, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 1451.
19 International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in
Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea,
May 3, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1415.
20 International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage,
Mar 23, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 1493.
21 UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE, PROTOCOL ON CIVIL
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY THE TRANSBOUNDARY
EFFECTS OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS ON TRANSBOUNDARY WATERS (2003),
http://www.unece.org/env/civil-liability/documents/protocol e.pdf.
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compensation. It ties together actions arising under both the Con-
vention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses
and International Lakes22 and the Convention on the Trans-
boundary Effects of Industrial Accidents.23
Lastly, there is a series of treaties concerning nuclear
liability which pre-date Chernobyl.24 The nuclear liability regime
is primarily embodied in two instruments. The first came from a
Convention held at Paris in 1960, on third party liability. 25 This
convention was aimed to balance competing needs and providing
victims with compensation while protecting the nuclear industry
from ruinous claims.26 This convention is coupled with the 1963
Brussels Supplementary Convention which sought to extend liabil-
ity limits. The second instrument is the 1963 Vienna Convention
27on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. After 1986's Chernobyl
disaster, the two Conventions were allied by way of the 1988 Joint
Protocol 28 which sought to provide one common civil nuclear
liability regime. Under this common scheme, operators of the
nuclear installations are exclusively and absolutely liable for
nuclear accidents. Fault, other than in situations concerning "acts
of armed conflict, hostilities, civil war or insurrection," is irrele-
vant.29 The operator is liable only for personal injury, death, and
loss of, or damage to, property. And the operator's liability is
limited both in time, 10 years from the date of the accident, and
22 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312.
23 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Mar. 17,
1992, 31 I.L.M. 1330.
24 See JULIA SCHWARTZ, INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR THIRD PARTY LAW: THE
RESPONSE TO CHERNOBYL (2006), http://www.nea.fr/html/law/chernobyl/
SCHWARTZ.pdf.
25 Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, July 29,
1960, 956 U.N.T.S. 251, amended by Protocol of 1964, Jan. 28, 1964 and
Protocol of 1982, Nov. 16, 1988.
26 See Kiss & Shelton, supra note 12, at 1141.
27 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21, 1963,
1063 U.N.T.S. 265.
28 Protocol to Amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage, Sept. 12, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1462.29 d
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amount, to be set by the legislation of each state party.30 Juris-
diction over legal actions lies exclusively with the courts of the
contracting party in whose territory the nuclear incident occurred.
Unfortunately, the conventions do not apply to nuclear incidents
arising in non-contracting states, or to damage suffered in the
territory of non-contracting states. The liability regime was
further revised to increase the amount and availability of compen-
sation for victims in the 1997 Convention on Supplementary
Compensation for Nuclear Damage and the 2004 Protocols to
Amend the Paris Convention and the Brussels Supplementary
Convention. 32
At the regional level, the "polluter pays" principle is also
imposed on legal persons in conventions concluded under the
auspices of the Council of Europe (COE). Similarly, the 2004 EU
Parliament and Council Directive, on environmental liability and
the prevention and remedying of environmental damage, also
forces industrial polluters to pay for environmental damage. 34
The foregoing civil liability regimes, despite providing for
the direct liability of private actors, do not provide for MNC
accountability under an international mechanism. Instead, they
detail provisions concerning the forum through which proceedings
may be instituted, usually the courts where either the damage
occurred, or where the dangerous activity was conducted, or the
habitual residence or place of business of the party who caused the
damage. 35 The conventions then require the state parties to
establish jurisdiction in their national courts as well as to give
recognition and enforce judgments rendered by the courts of other
30 d
31 See Kiss & Shelton, supra note 12, at 1141-42; Schwartz, supra note 22, at
44-45; The Encyclopedia of Earth Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage,
http://www.eoearth.org/article/Civil liabilityfor nuclear damage (last visited
Jan. 22, 20 10).
32 See Schwartz, supra note 22, at 49-57.
3 See Council of Europe Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting
from Activities Dangerous to the Environment art. 2(6), June 21, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 2028 (defining person as any individual or partnership, whether corporate
or not).
34 Council Directive 2004 35 CE, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56 (EC).
35 Council Directive 2004 35 CE, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56 (EC).
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state parties. The regulatory burden then falls to domestic legal
systems which may enact either civil or criminal liability.3 6
III. PART 2: INTERNATIONAL LAW PRESCRIBING DOMESTIC
REMEDIES
In addition to the foregoing instruments which impose
direct liability on MNCs in the domestic jurisdictions of their
respective state parties, other instruments, while not themselves
prescribing MNC accountability, require states to ensure that
effective remedies and means of redress are available at the
national level. Examples of such instruments abound.
For example, the Aarhus Convention 37 obliges states to
implement and develop means of redress at the domestic level for
violations of its procedural requirements and violations of any
national environmental laws.38 The Convention prescribes that
each state party must ensure that "members of the public have
access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts
and omissions by private persons and public authorities which
contravene provisions of its national law relating to the
environment." 39 To that end, the Convention also requires the
availability of "adequate and effective remedies" which are "fair,
equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive," 40 and that state
parties should consider "the establishment of appropriate
assistance mechanisms to remove or reduce financial and other
barriers to access to justice."41 While the Convention seeks to fill
the accountability lacuna, its effectiveness nevertheless depends on
national implementation measures, which in many instances have
36David M. Ong, The Impact ofEnvironmental Law on Corporate Governance:
International and Comparative Perspectives, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 685 (2001).
3'Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Dec. 21, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S.
447.
3 1Id at art. 9.
39 Id. at art. 9(3).
40 Id. at art. 9(4).
41 Id. at art. 9(5).
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been found to be lacking.42 At the international level nevertheless,
the Aarhus Convention is the first environmental treaty to establish
a Compliance Committee allowing for individual complaints to be
lodged. However, these complaints concern the failure of state
parties to comply with the Convention's requirements, rather than
direct MNC violations.43
Similarly, in 1998 the Council of Europe concluded its first
convention introducing corporate criminal liability for breaches of
environmental law.44 Its preamble recognizes that "imposing
criminal or administrative sanctions on legal persons can play an
effective role in the prevention of environmental violations." 45
Article 9 recommends that member states impose criminal liability
on corporations, although states can opt for imposing administra-
tive sanctions. Subsequently, in 2003, the Council of the European
Union adopted a "Framework Decision" requiring member states
to impose liability on legal entities for environmental offenses.46
Although the Framework Decision encourages criminal liability,
member states have the option of imposing criminal or civil fines
and other "effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions," such
as disqualification from certain industrial or commercial activities,
or even judicial supervision and disestablishment of the
*47corporation.
Lastly, the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation (NAAEC),48 the sister agreement to the North
42See EUROPEAN NETWORK OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ORGANIZATIONS,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AARHUS CONVENTION IN EU MEMBER STATES (2006),
http://www.justiceandenvironment.org/wp-content/wp-upload/JE2006Aarhus
legalanalysis.pdf.
43 See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe Aarhus Convention
Compliance Committee, http://unece.org/env/pp/compliance.htm (last visited
Jan. 22, 20 10).
44 Convention on the Protection of Environment through Criminal Law art. 2,
Nov. 4, 1998, Eur. T.S. No. 172 (providing that the Convention applies to the
activities of persons, as well as corporations).
451 Id. at pmbl.
46COuncil Directive 2003/80/JHA, O.J. (L 29) 55 (EC) (discussing the protection
of the environment through criminal law).
47 Id. at 57 (EC).
48 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sep. 14, 1993, 32
I.L.M. 1480.
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 49  also requires its
parties to ensure their domestic law assures a high level of
environmental protection50 without lowering domestic standards to
attract investment.
Each of the foregoing instruments therefore requires
national systems to act as their enforcement mechanisms insofar as
MNC misconduct is concerned. In fact to date, both environmental
regulation and environmental litigation concerning MNCs, have
largely occurred in the domestic realms.5' Despite this being the
most common form of achieving redress and MNC accountability,
domestic litigation is not without its obstacles, for example, the
unwillingness of domestic courts to entertaining international law
arguments in cases concerning environmental damage and the
common law defense of forum non conveniens, frequently render
such litigation complex. 52
IV. PART 3: ACCOUNTABILITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
At the international level, there are relatively few
mechanisms available for affected individuals or other parties to
complain of environmental damage by MNCs. Nevertheless, three
mechanisms are worthy of mention even if they mingle the issues
of state responsibility and MNC liability, and are not all hard-law
mechanisms. Returning to the NAEEC and NAFTA, although
neither instrument seeks to create any direct obligations for MNCs
operating in the territory of their state parties, like Canada,
49 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289.
50 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 44, at
art. 3.
For example, litigation against Union Carbide concerning the Bhopal gas leak
disaster; the claim against BHP for damage to the Ok Tedi River in Papua New
Guinea; and complaints against Royal Dutch/Shell allegedly acting in concert
with the Nigerian Government to the detriment of the Ogoni people. For an
overview of the most significant environmental litigation to date, see
MUCHLINSKI, supra note 6, at 556-66; Michael Anderson, Transnational
Corporations and Environmental Damage: Is Tort Law the Answer?, 41
WASHBURN L.J. 399, 405-06.
52 See International Environmental Law in National Courts 239-46 (Michael
Anderson & Paolo Galizzi eds., 2002).
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Mexico, and the United States, but they do establish complaints
mechanisms which provide for indirect MNC accountability at
both the national and international level.
Under the NAFTA Chapter 11, Article 1114(2), concerning
environmental measures allows, a state party (state A) which
"considers that another Party [state B] has relaxed its domestic
health, safety or environmental measures in order to encourage
investment], [to] request consultations with the other party and the
two parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such
encouragement."53 Articles 2006 to 2017 provide for alternatives
to consultation where agreement cannot be reached between the
parties.54 Although the complaints mechanism ultimately concerns
state B's failure to comply with its legal obligations under
NAFTA, the mechanism arguably allows states to indirectly
contest corporate activities in state B. For example, where state B
is concerned, the grant of a government license to a private actor
may breach domestic health, safety or environmental laws. The
weakness of this mechanism, however, is that the article only
provides state parties with standing to bring such complaints, not
individuals or NGOs. Moreover, even if state A did lodge a
complaint about the relaxation by state B of its legal obligations,
and the matter proceeded to an arbitral panel which issued a final
- 55report, such report is not binding on either party.
The NAEEC established a Commission for Environmental
Cooperation (CEC) with a mandate to conduct ongoing environ-
mental assessment of the NAFTA's impact on the environment and
to promote the effective enforcement of environmental law. Under
NAEEC there are two ways that a NAFTA state party can be the
subject of CEC scrutiny for an alleged failure to enforce its
environmental laws.
The first is the "Citizen Submissions on Enforcement
Matters" (SEM) process provided for by Articles 14 and 15 of the
NAEEC. Article 14 provides "[a]ny person or non-governmental
organization may make submissions to the Secretariat asserting a
[NAEECs] Party's failure to effectively enforce its environmental
5 North American Free Trade Agreement, supra note 45, at art. 1114(2).
54 Id. at arts. 2006-17.
5 Id.
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laws."56 While the complaints mechanism concerns complaints
about state failure, it indirectly concerns corporations. For
example, an active file under consideration by the Secretariat
would concern the "Wetlands in Manzanillo," Mexico.5 7 In this
case, a Mexican organization alleged that the Mexican government
failed to effectively enforce its environmental laws with regard to
the protection of the Laguna de Cuyutlin, Manzanillo, insofar as
Mexican authorities should not have granted favorable environ-
mental impact authorizations to two infrastructure projects, one
filed by the Federal Electricity Commission and another, operated
by a private actor, Z Gas del Pacifico.5 8 Thus it is evident that the
SEM process indirectly subjects corporate activity to international
-59inspection.
Therefore, the SEM process is neither judicial nor
adversarial, 60 nor does it seek to provide compensation or remedies
for victims.61 If the CEC Secretariat is apprised of a matter, 62 after
it receives all necessary information and submissions from
56 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 44, at
art. 14.
See Secretariat of the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Wetlands
in Manzanillo Case, Determination in Accordance With Article 14(1) of the
North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation, SEM-09-002 (Oct.
9, 2009).
58 Id.
59 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 44, at
art. 22 (providing that state parties call one another to task where there is
allegedly "a persistent pattern of failure by that other Party to effectively enforce
its environmental law"). The scheme envisages consultation and eventual
arbitration with a final report, which makes a finding as to a state's inaction and
provides for the eventual implementation of an action plan to remedy the
defaulting states' breaches. See id. at arts. 22-36.
60 See Commission for Environmental Cooperation Citizen Submission on
Enforcement Matters, http://www.cec.org/citizen/index.cfm?varlan english (last
visited Jan 22, 2010).
61 See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND
VOLUNTARISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES 93 (2002), http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db
900sid/ASIN7DBQ7F/$file/ICHRP Beyond%20Voluntarism.pdf.?openelement
62 See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note
44, at art. 14(3)(a) (if the concerned NAEEC party informs the CEC Secretariat
that the matter is the subject of a pending judicial or administrative proceeding
at the domestic level, the CEC Secretariat withdraws from the matter).
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concerned parties, it may prepare a factual record of the allegation
in question, which the Council may make publicly available. 63 In
that record, however, the CEC Secretariat cannot make determina-
tions or "rulings" as to whether a party is failing to effectively
enforce its environmental law obligations.64 The CEC's lack of
teeth nullifies the incentive for NGOs to file complaints about poor
governmental compliance with legal obligations.65 A revision of
the system so that it were able to hold states accountable for their
compliance breaches would prove more effective and more akin to
existing human rights bodies.
The NAEEC's second complaints method exists at the
international level and can be utilized where there is a "persistent
pattern of failure to effectively enforce its environmental law". 66
Apart from some (lengthier) procedural differences, 67 this method
mirrors the process provided for by NAFTA, i.e. it allows a fellow
state party to enter into consultations, and failing a successful
outcome, proceed to an arbitral panel. As noted by one review of
the efficiency of this mechanism, "it was designed so that it would
seldom be used." 68 Apart from its burdensome procedures, it
suffers from the principal weakness that only states may lodge
such complaints.69
The last international mechanism is provided by the 1976
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises,70 most recently
revised in 2000.71 The Guidelines are wide-ranging recommenda-
63 Id. at art. 15.
64 See Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Citizen Submissions on
Enforcement Matters, http://www.cec.org/citizen/index/cfm?varlan-english (last
visited Jan. 22, 2010).
65 See INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, NAFTA AND THE
ENVIRONMENT: SEVEN YEARS LATER (2000), http://www.piie.com/publications/
chapterspreview/322/iie2997.pdf.
66 See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note
44, at art. 22.
67 For a detailed analysis of the differences in the procedures, see INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 60, at 20-21.681d. at 18.
69 See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 56.
70 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, June 21, 1976, 15 I.L.M.
977.
71 Organisation for Economic. Co-operation and Development, supra note 5.
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tions addressed by governments to MNCs pertaining to all aspects
of corporate activity employment including industrial relations,
information disclosure and transparency, bribery, competition,
taxation, and, environmental considerations. 72 The OECD Guide-
lines allows complaints concerning both interpretations of the
Guidelines as well as alleged failures by MNCs to respect the
Guidelines. The Guidelines provide mandatory implementation
obligations for States as well as for the establishment of 'National
Contact Points' (NCPs) which constitute the Guidelines' enforce-
ment mechanism.73 The NCPs, are constituted by local govern-
ment offices in each of the OECD's 30 member states as well as its
11 non-member states which nevertheless adhere to the
Guidelines.74 The NCPs are tasked to promote the Guidelines and
handle the complaints, "specific instances" received. Once an NCP
receives a written complaint, it has considerable discretion as to
how to proceed with it. Assuming the complaint satisfies the
admissibility criteria, the purpose of the NCPs is to offer their
good offices to help the parties resolve the issue by facilitating
access to consensual, non-adversarial means of resolution, such as
conciliation or mediation. Thus possible outcomes could see the
parties agreeing to remediation or compensation. Conversely, if no
72 See The OECD's Revised Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises: A Step
Towards Corporate Accountability, http://www.foe.co.uk/resource/briefings/
oecd guidelines multinational.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
7 See Jan Huner, The Multilateral Agreement on Investment and the Review of
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, in LIABILITY OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 200-05 (Menno
T. Kamminga & Saman Zia-Zafiri eds., 2000); INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON
HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 56, at 67; Organisation for Economic. Co-
operation and Development, supra note 5, at 30.
74 See Ministry of Economic Development: Manatu Ohanga About the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, http://www.med.govt.nz/
templates/Page_ 17252.aspx (last visited Jan. 22, 2010). To date, the 11 non-
OECD states include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Egypt, Estonia, Israel, Latvia,
Lithuania, Peru, Romania, and Slovenia. Id.
75 See Business and Society Exploring Solutions, OECD National Contact
Points, http://baseswiki.org/en/OECD National Contact Points (last visited Jan
22, 2010). That is, inter alia, it is deemed to have been made in good faith, that
the complainant has a relevant interest, there is substance to the complaint and
consideration of the issue would contribute to the purposes and effectiveness of
the Guidelines. See id.
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agreement is reached following these efforts, the NCP issues a
statement of its view of whether there is a breach of the
Guidelines, and may make recommendations. Although strictly
speaking there is no "right of appeal", there is the possibility of
review of the NCPs recommendation or interpretation by the
OECD's Committee on International Investment and Multinational
Enterprises (CIIME).76 The fact that a company's reputation could
be damaged by claims of alleged violations of OECD Guidelines,
is recognized in the Guidelines which provide for the possibility of
keeping complaints confidential. 7
In contrast to the NAFTA mechanism, the OECD com-
plaint mechanism is open to all parties interested in a case of
violation, including victims, trade unions and even NGOs.
Moreover, and in contrast to the NAEEC, OECD complaints target
the MNC entity and not states. Generally speaking, a complaint
should be lodged with the NCP in the state of the violation.
However, in the event violations occur in a non-OECD state,
complaints may be lodged in the state where the MNC has its
headquarters. By corollary, this means complaints can be lodged
not only against MNCs originating from an OECD country, but
also against its entities that may operate outside the territory of an
OECD party.78 For example, a recent environmental complaint was
filed by a Norwegian NGO with its local NCP complaining of the
future operations of a Norwegian mining and exploration com-
pany, Intex Resources, which include a nickel mine and factory in
the Philippines, a non-OECD country.7 9
76 John Ruggie, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of
Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises,
Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility
and Accountability for Corporate Acts, 50, delivered to the Human Rights
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35 (Feb. 9, 2007); INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON
HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 56, at 67-68.
77 See INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 56, at
68; OECD WATCH, THE CONFIDENTIALITY PRINCIPLE, TRANSPARENCY AND THE
SPECIFIC INSTANCE PROCEDURE (2006), http://oecdwatch.org/publications-
en/Publication 1678/at download/fullfile.
78 Id.
79 4 OECD WATCH, QUARTERLY CASE UPDATE I (Spring ed. 2009),
http://oecdwatch.org/publications-en/Publication 3009/at download/fullfile
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The OECD Guidelines' profile was raised when the 2002
UN Expert Panel issued its report into the activities of illegal
exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).80 The Report considered
that 85 companies operating in the DRC, of which 57 operated in
OECD-adhering countries had contravened the Guidelines and the
UN Security Council subsequently called on the NCPs of the home
governments of the shamed companies to conduct investigations
- - 81into the actions of their companies.
Despite the flexibility offered by the OECD complaints
system, statistics show that as of July 2009, only 48
environmental-related complaints have been filed by NGOs with
the NCPs of OECD countries.82 Moreover, the NCP mechanism
has been criticised by NGOs as generally ineffective, 83 all the more
so in light of the subsequent inaction of the respective NCPs
concerns about the investigations into companies named in the
2002 UN Expert Panel's Report on the DRC.84
Another method of promoting MNC accountability for
environmental damage is through international financial institu-
tions. The World Bank Group (Group) is collectively formed by
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
(IBRD), informally, the World Bank, the International Develop-
ment Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation
(IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA).
The Group's individual institutions have introduced policies
dedicated to creating and promoting an ethical code for
80 See The Secretary-General, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. S / 2002 / 1146 (Oct. 16, 2002).
si S.C. Res. 1457, 14, U.N. Doc. S / RES /1457 (Jan. 24, 2003).
82 4 OECD WATCH, QUARTERLY CASE UPDATE 2 (Summer ed. 2009),
http://oecdwatch.org/publications-en/Publication 3087/at download/fullfile
83 See ELISA MORGERA, CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 247-66 (2009).
84 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE CURSE OF GOLD: DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF CONGO (2005), http://www.anglogodashanti.com/NR/rdonlyres/CBB6C75C-
EE9C-439E-962F-DDB5C52FB968/0/HRWDRCreport.pdf.
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businesses." The IFC and MIGA, whose clients uniquely belong
to the private sector, seek to directly condition the activities of
their clients by imposing performance standards, the satisfaction of
which is a prerequisite to the grant of IFC investment funds86 in
their Performance Standards on Social & Environmental Sustain-
ability.87 The IFC's Performance Standards define MNC roles and
responsibilities for managing their projects and the requirements
for receiving and retaining IFC support. The IFC reviews all
projects proposed for direct financing against its Performance
Standards. The IFC performance standards are mandatory and
contractually binding on its MNC clients and are further comple-
mented by other IFC reference documents such as its Policy on
Social and Environmental Sustainability and its Environmental,
Health, and Safety Guidelines (EHS Guidelines). Similarly, the
IFC's sister agency, MIGA, has developed Environmental and
Social Review Procedures and Safeguard Policies which bind its
private sector clients, an are modeled on those of the IFC. MIGA
otherwise follows the IFC's Performance Standards and EHS
Guidelines. MIGA's Board approved the revised Social and
Environmental Policy and Performance Standards in 2007.88
MNC compliance with both IFC and MIGA standards is
subject to review by the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO),
which may hear complaints from anyone adversely affected by the
actual or potential social or environmental effects of either an IFC
or MIGA-funded project. The CAO is a two-tiered mechanism.
First, the Ombudsman assesses the complaint and a solution is
85 See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR LABOUR STUDIES, GOVERNANCE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW & CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 2 (2008),
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/inst/download/1 16.pdf.
86 Ruggie, supra note 71, at 51; Business and Society Exploring Solutions,
World Bank Group: Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO), http://baseswiki.
org/en/World Bank Group: Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) (last
visited Jan 22, 2010).
8 See, e.g., WORLD BANK GROUP, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION,
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY (2006)
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/pol Performanc
eStandards2006 full/$FILE/IFC+Performance+Standards.pdf.
88 See World Bank Group, Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
Environmental & Social Safeguards, http://www.miga.org/policies/index sv.
cfm?stid=1589 (last visited Jan. 22, 2010).
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sought under his guidance. In the event that the conciliation
process under the Ombudsman is unsuccessful, the complaint may
be forwarded to the CAO's Compliance function. While any
possible outcome may be agreed to between the parties under the
Ombudsman, i.e. reductio ad absurdum, the MNC itself may reach
agreement with the complainants, the CA process can at best result
in public findings, not against the MNC in question. This high-
lights the essence of the CAO process is auditing IFC/MIGA
compliance with their internal policies and thus providing external
accountability, i.e. vis-d-vis project-affected individuals.89 The
Standards themselves do not create legal rights against MNCs, nor
does the CAO review process provide for direct MNC account-
ability. However, in order for the CAO to assess the performance
of the project and the complaint at hand, it is incidentally necessary
for the CAO to review the actions of the project sponsors and
whether implementation of IFC and MIGA standards meet the
relevant requirements. Thus MNC misconduct is indirectly
monitored by the CAO. In this limited sense then, the CAO is a
suitable mechanism for ensuring MNC conduct does not fall foul
of accepted standards, even if it cannot provide judicial remedies
for such breaches. 90
V. CONCLUSION
The foregoing leads us to the conclusion that state respon-
sibility is not the only answer to environmental damage. It is also
possible for MNCs to bear responsibility for their actions. Indeed,
in environmental law, the notion of MNC accountability is
commonly accepted as is illustrated by the liability regimes in
several conventions, even if the issue of MNC accountability
ultimately falls to be determined by the courts of the state parties
concerned. Liability conventions aside, international environ-
mental law does not otherwise g regulate MNC conduct or
misconduct. Indeed, most environmental treaties, for example, the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, rely on domestic
89 See Business and Society Exploring Solutions, supra note 81.
90 INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, supra note 56, at 108-
09.
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jurisdictions to implement its provisions. Although there are
several possibilities for lodging complaints concerning breaches of
environmental law by MNCs at the international level, only one,
complaints to NCPs under the OECD Guidelines, allows indi-
viduals to take MNCs to task directly. On balance, however, the
other international complaints mechanisms do not directly address
MNC accountability, as much as the responsibility of states or
even financial institutions for MNC misconduct. Notwithstanding
the efforts made in the international realm, MNC accountability is
an issue for the domestic realm.

